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Abstract: In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world 
has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the 
former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing 
‘overreactions’ to public signals as shown by Morris and Shin (2002). Recent experiments on games 
with strategic complementarities show that subjects attach a lower weight to public signals than 
theoretically predicted. Aggregate behavior can be better explained by a cognitive hierarchy model 
where subjects employ limited levels of reasoning. This paper analyzes the welfare effects of public 
information under such limited levels of reasoning and argues that for strategies according with 
experimental evidence, public information that is more precise than private information cannot reduce 
welfare, unless the policy maker has instruments that are perfect substitutes to private actions. 
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1 – Introduction 
There has been an extensive debate about the welfare effects of transparency in environments 
with strategic complemetarities, started by the seminal paper by Morris and Shin (2002). Strategic 
complementarities are widespread in macroeconomics, models of financial crises, price competition, 
investment in network goods, and many other economic situations. In games with strategic 
complementarities, public and private information about an uncertain state of the world have distinct 
effects, because information that is shared by several agents is more informative about the likely 
beliefs and actions of others than private information. Given that public signals are more informative, 
rational players put a higher weight on these signals than on private signals of equal precision. In 
equilibrium, the weight on public signals is even higher, because rational players account for the 
rationality of others and the attached weights are strategic complements. 
This may lead markets to ‘overreact’ to public signals and raise price volatility. In this context, 
institutions such as central banks committing to provide noisy public information may reduce expected 
welfare. The aim of this paper is to reconsider the extent to which public information may be 
detrimental to welfare when accounting for the fact that ‘real’ agents are not fully rational. Recent 
experiments on games with strategic complementarities show that subjects attach a lower weight to 
public signals than theoretically predicted. Aggregate behavior can be better explained by a cognitive 
hierarchy model where subjects employ limited levels of reasoning. This paper analyzes the welfare 
effects of public information under such limited levels of reasoning and argues that for strategies 
according with experimental evidence, public information that is more precise than private information 
cannot reduce welfare, unless the policy maker has instruments that are perfect substitutes to private 
actions. 
 Morris and Shin (2002) present a stylized beauty-contest game with weak strategic 
complementarities for analyzing the welfare effects of public and private information. In their game, 
an agent’s action is a weighted average of a public and a private signal. The equilibrium weight 
attached to the public signal is higher than its relative precision. In their welfare analysis, Morris and 
Shin concentrate on a case where those who predict the average opinion better gain at the expense of 
those whose prediction is worse. Here, coordination is a zero-sum game. Morris and Shin show that 
raising the precision of public signals may reduce expected welfare while raising the precision of 
private signals is always welfare improving.  
Cornand and Heinemann (2013) test the theoretical predictions of the model by Morris and 
Shin (2002) in a laboratory experiment. They measure the actual weights that subjects attach to public 
and private signals and find that observed weights are distributed around the predictions from a 
cognitive hierarchy model, where players take into account that other players receive the same public 
signals, but neglect that other players also account for others receiving the same public signals. Such a 
neglect of higher-order rationality has also been observed in many other experiments on beauty-
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contest games, cascade games, and coordination games with strategic complementarities.1 It seems to 
be a fairly robust result that actual players’ choices in these games are distributed around the level-2 
choice. Level-2 players respond in a rational way to the non-strategic part of a game and they account 
for other players responding rationally, but they neglect that other players also account for others’ 
rationality.  
In this paper, we apply limited levels of reasoning to four variants of the model by Morris and 
Shin (2002) that have been heavily discussed in the literature. In the original model by Morris and 
Shin (2002) with strategies derived from level-2 reasoning, public information is always welfare 
improving. The result also holds for weights associated with level 1 or any mixture of levels up to 
level 2. If, however, agents employ higher levels of reasoning, negative welfare effects of public 
information are possible. Since individual strategies are widely dispersed – including some subjects 
with higher levels of reasoning – we check that for the mixture of strategies observed in Cornand and 
Heinemann (2013) a higher precision of public information increases welfare.  
Angeletos and Pavan (2007a, b) emphasize that the welfare effects of transparency are 
sensitive to the extent to which coordination is socially valuable. Hellwig (2005), Roca (2010), 
Lorenzoni (2010) and Woodford (2005) embed the mechanism of Morris and Shin (2002) into a 
macro-framework, where coordination is socially valuable. Here both, public and private information 
contribute to social welfare. Under limited levels of reasoning, however, increasing the precision of 
private signals may reduce expected welfare. The positive welfare effects of public signals in this 
model are robust to limited levels of reasoning. 
Cornand and Heinemann (2008) introduce a concept of partial publicity by allowing for 
information that is provided to just a fraction of agents. They show that optimal policy requires to 
provide public signals with highest possible precision, but eventually not to all agents. Restricting 
signals to be partially public leads to a higher welfare than providing public signals to all agents with 
restricted precision. These qualitative results are robust to limited levels of reasoning, However, we 
find that the optimal degree of publicity is higher if agents apply level-2 reasoning than for 
equilibrium strategies. If public information is more precise than private information, then full 
transparency is optimal.  
Finally, we reconsider a model by James and Lawler (2011) in which the government can take 
policy actions against some fundamental shock. Since policy and private actions are perfect substitutes 
with respect to neutralizing aggregate shocks, the government can provide the optimal response to its 
own information. Private responses are still required to account for the additional information 
contained in agents’ private signals. This distribution of tasks achieves the first best. If the government 
                                                 
1
 Examples are Nagel (1995), Kübler and Weizsäcker (2004), and Baeriswyl and Cornand (2013). 
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discloses its own information as a public signal to private agents, agents reduce the weight they put on 
the private signal and, thus, private information enters the total response of the economy with a weight 
that is suboptimally small. For this reason, it is always optimal to withhold public information 
completely. This argument only requires that subjects put weights on signals that differ from the social 
optimum. Thus, complete intransparency is also optimal if agents follow level-2 reasoning. For level-1 
reasoning, however, transparency has no welfare effect, as it only shifts the adjustment from public to 
private actions without affecting the aggregate.  
Overall, these results indicate that under limited levels of reasoning, (i) public information is 
less detrimental (if at all) to welfare than predicted by equilibrium theory, (ii) private information can 
be welfare reducing.  
 In the remainder of this paper, we first present the original set-up by Morris and Shin (2002). 
Section 3 introduces limited levels of reasoning in this model and shows that the main result of Morris 
and Shin is not robust to level-2 reasoning. Sections 4 – 6 analyze limited levels of reasoning when 
coordination is socially desirable (Section 4), information can be partially public (Section 5), and 
policy actions can substitute private actions (Section 6). Section 7 concludes.  
   
2 – Welfare analysis in the Morris-Shin-model 
In the model of Morris and Shin (2002), there is a continuum of agents i. The payoff function 
for agent i is given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2, 1i i iu a r a r L Lθ θ≡ − − − − − , 
where ( )∫ −≡ 10 2 djaaL iji  and ∫≡ 10 djLL j . The utility function for individual i has two components: 
the first component is a standard quadratic loss in the distance between the underlying state θ and 
her/his action ai. The second component is reminiscent of the Keynesian beauty contest; 0 ≤  r < 1 is 
the weight on the beauty contest term. The loss is increasing in the distance between i’s action and the 
average action of the whole population. Agents gain from predicting the average opinion better than 
others, but the beauty-contest is a zero-sum game. Social welfare, as defined by the (normalized) 
average of individual utilities, is given by 
( ) ( ) ( )∫∫ −−=
−
≡
1
0
2
1
0
,
1
1
, diadiau
r
aW ii θθθ . 
As a consequence, a social planner, who cares only about social welfare, seeks to keep all agents’ 
actions close to state θ . While coordination affects individual payoffs, it does not affect social 
welfare. 
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Agents face uncertainty concerning the state. θ  has a uniform distribution on the reals and 
agents receive two kinds of signals that deviate from θ  by independent error terms with normal 
distribution. Each agent receives a private signal xi = θ + εi with precision β. Signals of distinct 
individuals are independent and the distribution of private signals is treated as exogenously given. 
Agents have access to a public signal y θ η= +  with precision α.  
The public signal is given to all agents. While a social planner would prescribe that agents 
choose actions in accordance with the expected state of the world, optimizing agents put a higher 
weight on the public signal, because it is more helpful in predicting the actions of other agents than 
uncorrelated private signals. In equilibrium, prior expected welfare is given by  
2
2
))1((
)1()(
r
rWE
−+
−+
−= βα
βα
,  
which is decreasing in the precision of public signals α , if )12()1(/ −−< rrβα . Since agents attach 
a weight to the public signal that exceeds its relative precision, noisy public signals drag the mean of 
private actions away from the fundamental. This bias towards the public signal reduces welfare and 
may dominate the positive welfare effect of actions being based on more precise information. 
Increasing the precision of private information, however, is always beneficial.  
Svensson (2006) criticized the negative welfare effects of transparency as being unrealistic. If 
public information is withheld, 0=α , expected welfare is β/1− . Using the restriction )1,0[∈r , 
Svensson shows that private information needs to be more precise than public information for 
expected welfare being smaller than β/1− . Since empirical estimates like Romer and Romer (2000) 
found public forecasts to be better than private forecasts, the disclosure of these forecasts would 
always raise expected welfare.2  
 
3 – A cognitive hierarchy model on the use of public and private 
information  
Cornand and Heinemann (2013) present an experiment, in which subjects repeatedly play a 
beauty-contest game based on Morris and Shin (2002). In each round, each subject is randomly 
matched with another subject, and the payoff function is such that players want to choose actions that 
are close to an unknown fundamental but also close to each other. Each subject receives two signals on 
the fundamental, a private signal and a common signal. The common signal is the same for both 
subjects, and subjects know, which of the two signals is common. All signals have the same precision. 
                                                 
2
 Morris et al. (2006) show that for correlated signals, the result by Morris and Shin (2002) may hold even when 
public signals are more precise than private signals. Myatt and Wallace (2008) also consider correlated private 
signals. They show that in a Lucas-Phelps island economy all signals should be provided with the same 
correlation coefficient. 
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Varying the relative importance of the coordination motive, Cornand and Heinemann measure the 
relative weights that subjects put on the two signals.3  
In a benchmark case, where subjects’ payoffs depend only on how close their actions are to 
the fundamental, subjects put equal weights on both signals. With increasing importance of 
coordination in their payoff function, the relative weight attached to the public signal increases. 
However, these weights are significantly smaller than predicted by equilibrium theory. Observed 
weights can be explained by limited levels of reasoning, where level-1 is defined by the optimal action 
of a player who neglects that public signals provide more information about other players’ beliefs, and 
level-2 is the best response to level 1. The experiment reveals that for interior values of r, subjects’ 
weights on the public signal are smaller or around the weights associated with level 2. In the limiting 
case where subjects’ payoffs depend only on the distance between their actions (r=1), subjects tend to 
apply higher levels of reasoning. However, they still put a positive weight on their private signals, 
which prevents full coordination.4  
Models of cognitive hierarchies are based on the assumption that agents decide with limited of 
levels of reasoning about decisions of others. Nagel (1995) and Stahl and Wilson (1994) define level-0 
types as subjects who choose an action randomly from a uniform distribution over all possible actions. 
For k > 0, a level-k type is playing best response to level k – 1. Obviously, this definition hinges on the 
definition of the action space. While experiments typically have a bounded action space, the game by 
Morris and Shin (2002) allows for actions being reals. Hence level-0 types chose actions from a 
uniform distribution on the reals. If actions have a uniform distribution on the reals, expected losses 
from the coordination part of the payoff function are infinite for any action, so that any action is a best 
reply as long as r > 0. However, expected losses resulting from deviations from the fundamental are 
minimized by choosing the expected state. Hence, we define the best response to a uniform 
distribution over all reals as )(1 θii Ea = . Note that )(1 θii Ea =  is the best response of a player who 
ignores that public signals are shared with other players and it is also the welfare maximizing strategy 
combination.  
The action of a level-1 player is 
( ) βα
αβθ
+
+
==
yx
Ea iii
1 yxi )1( 11 γγ −+= , 
where )/(1 βαβγ +=  is the weight that a level-1 player attaches to the private signal.  
Suppose that a player j attaches weight 1γ  to her private signal. The best response to this is  
                                                 
3
 Appendix C compares the results for the different treatments with theoretical predictions from equilibrium 
theory and different levels of reasoning.  
4
 Equilibrium theory does not yield a unique prediction for r=1: any coordinated strategy is an equilibrium. 
However, the limit of equilibria in games with increasing r uniquely selects a strategy in which all agents follow 
the public signal and ignore all private information. 
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So, the action associated with level-2 reasoning is 
yrxra ii 2
2
2
2
2
)(
)1(
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)1(
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βαβ
+
++
+
+
+−
=  
and the weight on private signals for a second level of reasoning is  
2
2
2 )(
)1(
βα
βαβγ
+
+−
=
r
. 
If all agents are level-2 players, the expected welfare is given by 
( )( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
.)(
)(1)1(1)(
)1(,
3
22
2
2
2
2
1,0
2
22
1,0
2
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αββα
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+
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
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

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Taking derivatives and rearranging terms, we get  
( )
( ) 0
)1()2(
4
2222
>
+
−+++
=
∂
∂
βα
ββαα
α
rrWE
 
and 
( )
( ) .0
)2()1(
4
2222
>
+
+++−
=
∂
∂
βα
ββαα
β
rrWE
 
Hence, the comparative statics exercise shows that increasing the precision of either type of 
information unambiguously increases welfare. This result is in stark contrast to Morris and Shin 
(2002), who show that increasing the precision of public signals may reduce welfare.  
Result 1: In stark contrast to Morris and Shin’s welfare analysis, we find that – when agents have a 
level of reasoning of degree 2 – increasing the precision of public information is always raising 
expected welfare.   
This result still holds for any mixture of level-1 and level-2 agents. Since expected welfare is 
independent from coordination failure and just depends on how close actions are to the fundamental, 
any information that yields a lower expected difference between actions and fundamentals, raises 
expected welfare. If an agent attaches a weight as prescribed by level 1, level 2, or anything in 
between, an increasing precision of signals reduces the expected deviation of her action from the 
fundamental. Hence, if all agents apply low levels (even different ones), increasing precision of 
information increases expected welfare.  
With higher levels of reasoning, the relative weights on the two signals approach equilibrium 
weights, for which we know that public information can be welfare detrimental. This raises the 
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question, at which level of reasoning such negative welfare effects start showing up. For higher levels 
of reasoning, the algebraic solution becomes untractable, so that we refer to simulations. For level 3, 
we examine a wide range of parameters for which we determine the sign of the derivative of expected 
welfare with respect to the precision of public signals5. As shown in Figure 1, we detect parameter 
combinations with r > 0.6 and a high relation αβ / , for which an increase in the precision of public 
signals α reduces expected welfare.6 Note, however, that Svensson’s (2006) critique applies even more 
for limited levels of reasoning: if public information is withheld and agents employ level-3 reasoning, 
then private signals need to be more than 1.6 times as precise as the public signal for disclosure of the 
public signal to have a negative welfare effect. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Derivative of expected welfare with respect to the precision of public information α for level-
3 reasoning when the coordination part is a zero-sum game.  
  
 
Whether increasing the precision of public information raises or lowers expected welfare if 
some agents apply level 2 or a lower level and others apply level 3 or a higher level, depends on the 
distribution of these types of players in the population. In Appendix D, we estimate the share of 
subjects who followed different levels of reasoning in the experiment of Cornand and Heinemann 
(2013). We show that for this distribution public information is welfare improving. Note however, that 
the gains from more precise public information to agents with level 1 or 2 are small compared to the 
                                                 
5
 Appendix A determines the derivative of expected welfare with respect to the precision of public signals α. 
6
 Simuations are provided in the online appendix: http://www.macroeconomics.tu-berlin.de/fileadmin/ 
fg124/heinemann/downloads/welfare_under_LLR.xls. 
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losses for high-level agents. Hence, if all players would be at least level 1, even a small proportion of 
equilibrium players would be sufficient to cause detrimental welfare effects of public information.  
It is a surprising result that negative welfare effects of public signals cannot occur when agents 
apply up to 2 levels of reasoning, but may be present for higher levels. In this paragraph, we shortly 
discuss what we view to be the intuitive reason behind this critical value. Level-2 players put a higher 
weight on public signals than justified by their relative precision, because they account for the 
additional payoff that they gain from predicting the likely actions of the other players. Thus, noisy 
public signals drag the entire range of private actions away from the state of the world in direction of 
the public signal. However, the public signal also contributes to agents’ forecasts of the state, which 
reduces the dispersion of actions around this state. For level-2 reasoning, the first effect can never 
outweigh the latter. By definition of level 2, agents do not account for other agents to put a higher 
weight on the public signal, and thereby, the welfare detrimental effects of public information 
associated with strategic complementartities cannot unfold. Strategic behavior only kicks in, when 
agents also account for the higher weights of others, which requires more than 2 levels of reasoning. 
Then, each player’s asymmetric response to the two signals induces other players to respond with an 
even higher weight on the public signal. Strategic complementarity affects behavior only from level 3 
onwards. This is because agents account for others’ overreactions to public signals only from level 3 
onwards. Such higher-level reasoning seems to be a pre-requisite for public information to be welfare 
detrimental. 
 
4 – Welfare analysis for level-2 reasoning with coordination entering 
welfare 
If coordination is socially desirable, then public information is beneficial in equilibrium, while private 
information may have detrimental effects on welfare. This is an outcome, for example in  Woodford’s 
(2005) variant of the model, where coordination enters the welfare function. In this section, we check 
the robustness of these results with respect to limited levels of reasoning. The payoff for agent i is 
given by 
∫ −−−−−=
1
0
22 )())(1(),( djaararau jiii θθ . 
Summing up individual utilities, social welfare is given by: 
  
( ) ( ) ( )∫ ∫ ∫∫ −−−−−=≡
1
0
1
0
1
0
22
1
0
)()1(,, djdiaardiardiauaW jiii θθθ , 
where the last component accounts for socially desirable coordination. If agents attach weight γ  to 
private signals, expected welfare is 
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Inserting the weight 2γ , associated with level-2 reasoning, the sign of ( ) β∂∂ /WE equals the sign of7  
( ) .12111
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Simulations as depicted in Figure 2, show that the sign of this term is ambiguous.  
 
Figure 2 – Derivative of the expected welfare with respect to the precision of private information for level-2 
reasoning in the game where coordination is socially useful.  
More precisely, increasing the precision of private information can reduce welfare if αβ /  < 3 and r > 
0.6.8 The reason is that agents put a larger weight on private signals than is socially optimal. Higher 
precision of private signals raises the weight on private signals, which impedes desirable coordination. 
In the extreme case where r → 1, providing subjects with private information would always be 
detrimental if they attach a positive weight to it. The experiment by Cornand and Heinemann (2013), 
but also Fehr et al. (2011) indicate that subjects are indeed responding to private signals in pure 
coordination games as for r = 1.  
                                                 
7
 See proof in Appendix B. 
8
 Simuations are provided in the online appendix: http://www.macroeconomics.tu-berlin.de/fileadmin/ 
fg124/heinemann/downloads/welfare_under_LLR.xls. 
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A rising precision of public signals unambiguously raises expected welfare. As shown in 
Appendix B, this also holds for level-2 reasoning. Qualitatively, the result is the same as for fully 
rational agents. So, the advantage of transparency when coordination is socially desirable is robust to 
limited levels of reasoning. 
Result 2: If coordination is socially desirable and agents apply limited levels of reasoning, increasing 
the precision of private information may reduce expected welfare, while an increasing precision of 
public information is always beneficial.   
 
5 - Limited levels of reasoning and partial publicity 
Concepts of intermediate publicity as in Cornand and Heinemann (2008), Morris and Shin (2006), or 
Myatt and Wallace (2008)9 seem especially relevant for representing the way subjects deal with public 
signals. The model of Cornand and Heinemann (2008) is very similar to that of Morris and Shin 
(2002) with the same utility, distribution, and welfare functions. The difference is that agents have 
access to the public signal y only with some probability P.10 In an application, Walsh (2007) has 
shown that such partial publicity may be especially valuable if cost shocks are serially correlated.  
Cornand and Heinemann (2008) show that it is always better to provide public information 
with highest possible precision and eventually disclose this information only to some fraction of all 
agents than withholding public signals entirely.11 The optimal degree of publicity may be smaller than 
one even if an increasing precision of fully public signals has positive welfare effects. In particular, 
partial publicity may be optimal when public information is more precise than private signals. Thus, 
the result survives Svensson’s (2006) critique. We now address the question, whether these results are 
robust to limited levels of reasoning. 
Let us solve the Cornand and Heinemann model for two levels of reasoning. Again, the first 
level of reasoning for a player who receives both signals is given by the Bayesian expectation of θ, so 
that the weight on the private signal with a first level of reasoning is )/(1 βαβγ +=  and the 
corresponding action is yxa jj )1( 11 γγ −+= . The best response to this is  
)]()1())1()(([)()1(
)()()1(
11 jijii
jiii
xEPyxEPrEr
arEEra
−+−++−=
+−=
γγθ
θ
 
                                                 
9
 Myatt and Wallace (2008) extend the information structure to include correlated private signals. They show 
that in a Lucas-Phelps island economy all signals should be provided with the same correlation coefficient. 
10
 Since there is a continuum of identical agents, the fraction of agents who receive public information equals P 
almost certainly. Without loss of generality, agents ],0[ Pi ∈  receive the public signal and agents ]1,(Pi ∈  rely 
on their private signals only. The signal y is “public” in the sense that the actual realization of y is common 
knowledge among agents ],0[ Pi ∈ . 
11
 Baeriswyl and Cornand (2013) show that limiting the degree of publicity has the same welfare effects as 
providing information to all agents with idiosyncratic noise. 
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Hence, the weight on private signals for the second level of reasoning is  
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As Cornand and Heinemann (2008) have shown, the expected welfare for a degree of publicity 
P is given by: 
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where γ  is the weight that agents put on the private signal. If agents use equilibrium strategies, the 
weight on the private signal is  
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and the resulting optimal degree of publicity is 
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If, instead, agents use level-2 reasoning  
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and expected welfare changes with variations in the degree of publicity P according to  
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Thus, for level-2 reasoning the optimal degree of publicity is  





 +
= β
βαγ
r
P
3
,1min)( 2* .  
The optimal degree of publicity may be smaller than 1, even if agents have limited levels of reasoning. 
In this respect, the qualitative result by Cornand and Heinemann (2008) is robust. However, optimal 
publicity is larger than in an economy where agents use equilibrium strategies. Furthermore, for 
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)( 2* γP  to be smaller than 1, we need 74.013/ <−< rβα . Thus, contrary to the result by Cornand 
and Heinemann (2008), accounting for limited level of reasoning makes the optimal degree of 
publicity subject to Svensson’s (2006) critique: with level-2 reasoning, public information needs to be 
less precise than private information to obtain an interior optimal degree of publicity. Thus, we can 
state our third result. 
 
Result 3: when agents have a level of reasoning of degree 2 – the optimal degree of publicity may be 
smaller than 1. In contrast to the conclusion from the equilibrium analysis in Cornand and Heinemann 
(2008), public information needs to be sufficiently less precise than private information to justify 
limited publicity. 
 
6 – Welfare effects of transparency with policy interventions and limited 
levels of reasoning  
James and Lawler (2011) show that opacity is always optimal when the central bank simultaneously 
releases a public signal and uses a policy instrument for stabilization policy. The reason is that public 
policy and private actions are perfect substitutes in responding to the fundamental (shock). In the first-
best solution, the sum of an agents’ private and the public action12 should equal the expected state of 
the world given this agent’s private and the government’s information. By disclosing its information to 
private agents, the government induces a distortion in private actions towards this public signal. If the 
government would act after private agents, it could undo the bias and transparency would have no 
welfare effect. With simultaneous decisions, however, private agents take the government’s 
equilibrium action into account and deviate even further from their private signals. Thereby, the sum 
of both actions gets distorted away from the optimum. In order to avoid this, the government should 
secretely respond to its information without disclosing or signaling it to the private sector. This logic is 
robust to coordination being socially desirable and to the possibility of providing partially public 
information (James and Lawler, 2012). As we formally show in this section, it also holds when private 
agents choose actions with limited limited levels of reasoning. The conclusions by James and Lawler 
just require that private responses to public signals differ from the social optimum, which is true under 
limited levels of reasoning of any degree except 1.   
In their model, there is a policymaker and a continuum of private sector agents, indexed by i 
and uniformly distributed over the unit interval. Agent i chooses action ∈ia R to maximize a utility 
function: 
                                                 
12
 Actually, it is the difference, because James and Lawler (2011) define private and policy actions with opposite 
signs. 
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22 )()()1( LLrgaru iii −−−−−−= θ
, 
where θ  is the fundamental state of the economy, g is the policymakers’ instrument, r is a constant, 
such that 0 ≤  r < 1,  ( )∫ −≡ 10 2 djaaL iji , and ∫≡ 10 djLL j . Both the policymaker and agents are 
uncertain about the true state θ. Prior to deciding on g, the policymaker observes a noisy signal z 
z=θ + φ, with φ ~N(0, σφ2). 
The signal that the policymaker discloses to the public is 
y=θ + φ + ξ, with ξ ~N(0, σξ2). 
Additionally to receiving the public signal y, agents also observe their own idiosyncratic noisy signals: 
xi = θ + ει, with ει ~N(0, σε2), ]1,0[∈i . 
All noise terms are independent of θ, and independent of each other. James and Lawler assume that 
the policymaker follows the rule: 
.zg ρ=
 
With such informational structure, private agents’ expectations are given by 
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Note that ργγ +=+ 11211 . The policy parameter ρ will turn out to be negative. The best response to 
1
ia (which is the action of a level-2 player) is: 
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In this framework, expected welfare is given by 
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To derive the optimal communication strategy given the optimal policy, we need to study the 
sign of the derivative of the expected welfare with respect to σξ2 at the optimal stabilization policy ρ*. 
Inserting level-2 weights in the expected welfare function and solving its first-order condition yields 
the optimal policy parameter 
  242222
422222
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)(
*
ξεφε
εξφε
σσσσ
σσσσρ
r
r
++Σ
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The resulting expected welfare is given by  
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The derivative of this expression with respect to the variance of public information is 
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This derivative is unambiguously positive, which  indicates that the expected welfare increases 
with rising variance of public information. As in the original contribution by James and Lawler 
(2011), optimal policy calls for the government secretely responding to its information about the shock 
by its policy variable. Without any public information, private agents are left to respond to their 
private signals only. Recall that 1||1211 =++ ργγ . The optimal response of the government equals the 
relative precision of its information compared to the precision of private signals, while private agents 
respond to their signals with a factor that equals the relative precision of their signals. In effect, 
),|( zxEga ii θ=− , which is the the optimal response to a private agent’s available information that 
a social planner would implement.   
 
Result 4: As in James and Lawler (2011), social welfare is unambiguously decreasing with rising 
precision of public signals when agents have limited levels of reasoning of degree 2. 
 
7 – Conclusion 
The literature in the vein of Morris and Shin (2002) has largely been interpreted in terms of central 
bank communication. This literature concentrates on discussing welfare effects of central bank 
 16
announcements using equilibrium theory. Experiments, such as Nagel (1995) or Cornand and 
Heinemann (2013) indicate that actual behavior in beauty contest games can be better described by 
level-2 reasoning. Under limited levels of reasoning subjects attach smaller weights to public 
information than in equilibrium. This at least reduces negative welfare effects of public information. In 
stark contrast to equilibrium analyses, we find that – when agents have a level of reasoning of degree 2 
– increasing the precision of public information is always raising welfare and even partial publicity 
can improve welfare only if public signals are less precise than private information.  
In summation, negative welfare effects of transparency require that strategic 
complementarities be sufficiently strong, the private values of coordination be sufficiently higher than 
the social value of coordination, signals provided by the central bank be of a low precision compared 
to private information, and agents apply high levels of reasoning. If any of these conditions is violated, 
it is unlikely that transparency will be detrimental to social welfare. Empirical evidence indicates that 
at least some of these conditions are violated. Thus, we conclude that strategic complementarities 
alone do not justify intransparency.  
Conclusions are different if the policy maker can take actions that are perfect substitutes to 
private actions. Then, the policymaker should respond to its own information as secretely as possible 
and avoid disclosing or signalling its information to the public. 
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Appendix 
A. Derivative of expected welfare with respect to the precision of the public signal 
for level-3 reasoning without coordination entering welfare 
The expected welfare is increasing with rising α if and only if   
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We can then calculate the derivative of the expected welfare with respect to α, as a function of α, s 
and r: 
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B. Derivatives of expected welfare with respect to the precisions of private and 
public information for level-2 reasoning with coordination entering welfare 
The expected welfare is always increasing in the precision of public information α. It is increasing in 
the precision of private information β if and only if  
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We can then calculate the derivatives of the expected welfare with respect to α and β, as functions of 
α, s and r: 
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C. Limited levels of reasoning in the lab (Cornand and Heinemann, 2013) 
Table A summarizes the weights on the private signal for increasing levels of reasoning and the 
equilibrium weight on the private signal for different values of r. It also provides average observed 
weights (for the last half of rounds) in the experiment by Cornand and Heinemann (2013).  
Value of r Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 … Average observed 
weight 
Equilibrium weight  
(infinite levels of reasoning) 
0 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 … 0.506 0.50 
0.25 0.50 0.437 0.429 0.429 … 0.478 0.429 
0.5 0.50 0.375 0.344 0.336 … 0.440 0.333 
0.75 0.50 0.312 0.242 0.216 … 0.341 0.2 
1 0.50 0.25 0.125 0.062 … 0.242 0 
Table A – Theoretical and observed weight on xi depending on r and on the level of reasoning 
For interior values of r, most estimated weights on private signals are close to or above the weights 
given by level-2 reasoning. In treatments with r=0.5 and r=0.25, weights on the private signal are 
usually higher than the weights from level-2 reasoning. The hypothesis that weights equal those from 
level-2 reasoning is rejected in these treatments. In the treatment with r=0.75, weights are distributed 
around the weight from level 2. Higher levels can be rejected by one-sided tests at 5%. In the 
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treatment with r=1, the weights tend to converge towards equilibrium, even though convergence is not 
settled within ten rounds. “These inhomogeneous test results indicate that subjects might behave in 
accordance to higher levels of reasoning with increasing r.” (Cornand and Heinemann 2013, p. 16)  
 
D.  Welfare effects of public information with heterogeneous strategies 
The theoretical analysis in the main text assumes that all agents employ the same strategy. The 
experiment by Cornand and Heinemann (2013), however, reveals that subjects do not converge to one 
strategy, but rather employ different strategies throughout the experiment. In particular, some subjects’ 
strategies are close to equilibrium or put an even higher weight on public signals. Such a mixture of 
strategies may result in public information reducing expected welfare. This depends on the share of 
agents employing these different strategies. To deal with welfare effects under heterogeneity, we use 
the data of Cornand and Heinemann (2013) and estimate individual weights on the private signal for 
each subject according to ittititit uyxcya +−+=− )(γ , where iγ  is the individual weight on the 
private signal. Then, we distinguish the following 12 strategy types, allowing for a slack in estimated 
individual weights of 0.02: 
1. agents attach about the same weight to both signals (level-1),  
2. agents weigh signals in accord with level-2,  
3. agents weigh signals in accord with level-3,  
4. agents respond to signals with equilibrium weights (level infinity),  
5. agents attach weight 0 to the private signal, 
6. agents attach weight 1 to the private signal, 
7. agents attach weights between level 1 and 2, 
8. agents attach weights between level 2 and 3, 
9. agents attach weights between level 3 and equilibrium weight, 
10. agents put weights on the private signal between 0.5 and 1, 
11. agents attach weights on the private signal between 0 and the equilibrium weight, 
12. agents whose weights on the private signal are negative or exceed 1, 
In a level-of-reasoning approach, strategies 5, 6, and 10 – 12 are attributed to random behavior 
(level 0). However, we find very different densities of these strategies. Therefore, we distinguish them. 
Shares of strategy types in the population are denoted by Φ1 to Φ12. To get estimates for these shares, 
we first look for each individual weight, whether it could be explained by either of strategies 1 to 6 
allowing for a deviation of estimated weights by at most 0.02. If an action is consistent with several of 
these strategies, we attribute it to the strategy that is closer. Remaining strategies can be uniquely 
attributed to either of the remaining types. For types 7 to 11, we assume that weights have a uniform 
distribution in the respective interval. For type 12, we use the actually observed weights.  
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For our welfare comparison, we take the distribution of strategy types estimated with data 
from the second half of each treatment. According to our procedure on classifying strategies, we get 
one distribution for each treatment laid out in Table A. 
Strategy s 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Treatment r=0.25 40.6   9.4 0 6.3 0 0 12.5 0 0 21.9   9.4 0 
Treatment r=0.5  
(standard sessions) 
26.0   8.3   6.3 3.1   1.0 0 24.0 0 0 17.7 13.5 0 
Treatment r=0.5 
(control sessions) 
39.6 10.4   3.1 2.1   2.1 0 16.7 0 0 19.8   5.2   1.0 
Treatment r=0.75
 21.9   8.3   2.1 3.1 12.5 0 21.9   3.1   1.0 13.5 11.5   1.0 
Table A – Shares Φs of strategy types in Treatments r=0.5, r=0.25, and r=0.75, second half, in percent. 
There were two subjects, whose estimated weights on private signals in the respective 
treatments were outside [0,1]: Session 20, Subject 16 has an estimated weight on the private signal of 
1.04, Session 13, Subject 16 has a weight of -0.05.   
 Next, we calculate algebraically the expected squared deviation of actions from the 
fundamental state θ for an arbitrary weight γ on private signals  
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where 12γ  is the actually observed weight for the subject of type 12. Solving the integrals, the 
expected welfare loss equals 
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We calculate the expected welfare loss according to this formula for several values of r > 0.5 and α/β 
and check in which cases an increase in α/β raises or lowers the welfare loss. Calculations are provided 
in the online appendix http://www.macroeconomics.tu-berlin.de/fileadmin/fg124/heinemann/ 
downloads/welfare_under_LLR.xls and show that increasing the precision of public information, α, 
raises expected welfare for each of the four distributions of strategies. Looking closer at these 
simulations, we found that this result is mainly due to the large proportion of players who put weights 
on the private signal that are lower than in equilibrium or higher than for level 1 (strategy types 5, 6, 
and 10 – 12). If we remove those agents and just look at remaining strategy types keeping their 
relative shares in the population  
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we detect negative welfare effects of increasing precision of public signals for some parameter 
combinations with r > 0.75 and β/α > 20. This result also holds for each of the four distributions and it 
would still hold, if the proportion of equilibrium players is much smaller.  
